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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals 
of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND 
Record No. 2718 
HOMER ALBERT 
vs. 
COMMONWEAL TH OF VIRGINIA 
PETITION 
To The Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court of Appeals 
of Virginia: 
Your petitioner, Homer Albert, would respectfully repre-
sent unto your honors that he is aggrieved by the final judgment 
of the Circuit Court of Giles County, entered on the r 7th day 
of September, r 942, when he was senten.ced to serve a term of 
four years in the penitentiary for the accidental killing of one 
Lydia Ward Davidson Johnson. A transcript of the record in 
the said proceeding is herewith filed. 
The case was upon an indictment for manslaughter found 
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at the September term of the said .court, and to which he plead 
not guilty. 
The offense for which he was tried was alleged to, have 
happened on the 27th day of July, I 942, near six o'clock in 
the afternoon, and on the Highway Bridge across New River at 
Ripplemead, Giles County, Virginia. 
The defendant was a truck driver for one 0. M. Collins, 
who lived and had his place of business at Pembroke, Giles 
County, and was engaged in hauling crushed stone, the product 
of the Pembroke Limestone Works, to Pearisburg Station to be 
used in the construction of a bridge across New River then being 
erected by the State Highway Department. He had been so 
hauling for some days, and on this particular day be had haul-1 
ed five loads of crushed stone from Pembroke to Pearisburg 
Station, hauling six tons at a load. The distance was about 
eight miles, and is over State Highway No. 8 practically all of 
the way. At the point where the accident occurred is a large 
concrete bridge about one thousand feet long and is twenty three 
feet wide, extending in a Northweste.rn and Southeastern direc-
tion across New River. The approach to the bridge from the 
Eastern side of the river is down a long grade in a Northern di-
rection and the road .curves sharply to the left to get onto the 
bridge. The grade there is considerable, as it is a well known 
fact that New River flows through Giles County between 
2 * high and precipitous cliffs *of rock. For a distance of 
three quarters of a mile there is a long steep grade approach-
ing the river and the bridge across it, and about three hundred 
yards from the Bridge there is a curve. At this curve, o·n this 
day, as the defendant was hauling the sixth load, of six tons 
of crushed stone hi~ hydraulic brakes failed to work properly, 
and he tried in vain to get them to work by applying foot 
power to them, trying to "pump" them so that they would 
hold ( and sometimes by this pumping process they will take 
hold, see testimony of Sergeant Hedrick, R .p. 6), and all of the 
while, of course, having to steer the truck so as to avoid running 
over the precipice on his left, and into the high embankment on 
his right, and look out for traffic in addition to his other em-
barrassments. From all of the evidence he appears to have got-
ten along all right until he was near the approach to the bridge 
because one W .. T. MacMahan in his testimony, (R. p. 8} says 
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that be passed the truck driven by the defendant at a point 
about one hundred feet east of thP. bridge, and that he had fol-
lowed him for some distance, (without indicating how far), 
that "it weaved a little, but not terribly bad, that it was not 
from under control." The defendant's testimony is to the ef-
fect that he wrestled with the brakes from the .curve and that he 
lost entire control of the truck, on account of his inability to 
get the brakes to hold, about one hundred feet from the East 
end of the Bridge, at which time he undertook to lean over and 
try to use the emergency brake, in which position he was when 
he entered upon the Bridge, and was still in till the truck struck 
the balustrade on his right hand side of the bridge. (The testi-
mony of Sergeant Hedrick, R. p. 4, shows that the truck struck 
the balustrade on the defendant's right hand side of the bridge 
sixty one feet from the point where it struck Mrs. Johnson). 
The distan.ce from the end of the bridge to where it struck the 
balustrade was one hundred and twelve steps, the equivalent of 
three hundred and thirty six feet by estimation. The defendant 
is positive that he did not see the Johnsons in the path of his 
truck. This is evident, and may be explained in at least two 
ways; that he was still wrestling with the emergency brake, 
3 * or that the Johnson~ were * not in the path of the truck 
till after it struck the balustrade, for the uncontradicted 
evidenc~ is that "just before they got to the point where she was 
struck they had both stopped on their right hari.'d side of the! 
bridge and leaned over the guard rail watching some young 
people bathi'r,1g in New River, and had crossed back etc. etc." 
The quoted words are from the testimony of William E. 
Johnson, the husband of the deceased, who was accompanying 
her when she was killed, (R. p. 7) . It will be noted on the 
same page of the Record in the testimony of Mr. Johnson that 
he said that he did not see the truck till "it was about fifty feet 
from them." 
The deceased was said by Mr. Johnson to have been knock-
ed down and injured, and was taken up by a Mr. Vest and con-
veyed to St. Elizabeth's Hospital, at Pearisburg, where she 
shortly thereafter died from the said injuries. 
It was charged by the Commonwealth, and testified to by 
r;everal witnesses, that the defendant had been drinking and was 
intoxicated at the time of the occurrence. This the defendant 
denied and supported his denial by the positive testimony of his 
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father. Gordon Albert, and 0. M. Collins for whom he work-
ed, and who arrived at the scene of the accident shortly there·-
after because of an anonymous telephone call made prior to the 
accident, (0. M. Collins' testimony, R. p. I 7), and took the 
defendant off the truck and carried him to bis father's home at 
Pembroke. Several other witnesses in a position to know tes-
tified that the defendant was not drinking prior to· the accident. 
The statements of the witnesses for the Commonwealth, by 
whom it was sought to show that the defendant was intoxi-
.cated were vague and indefinite, saying that he looked like it. 
and he acted like it, but could not say that he was drunk. One 
Lafon, (R. p. 1 1) was among the number, and he proved to be 
the person who made the telephone call to Mr. Collins, but he 
stated that he did not know who had told him that Albert was 
drunk. He used the expression that the defendant was either 
crazy or drunk, but he testified that he could not say that 
the defendant was drunk. The whole drunk charge is 
4 * built up around *the anonymous telephone call and the 
fact that the defendant did v·ery unwisely drink to the 
point of intoxication at his home after the accident, and was in 
that condition when he was arrested an hour or so afterward. 
This was induced, as he said, by his nervous and depressed con-
dition brought en by fear of what might have happened, but 
which he did not kown because Mr. Collins had taken him away 
before he had an opportunity to know. No one ever testified 
that they had seen the defendant drink. Two witnesses tes-
tified of opportunities which the defendant had to drink, but 
said that he did not drink any of the whiskey which they had 
and which he could have had. 
The defendant denies that he was drinking at all at the 
time of the accident, and he attributes the accident to the de-
fective brakes. And surely his testimony can not be wholly dis-
regarded just be-cause he is the defendant. If it be said that he 
is interested it will be admitted, but at the same time it will be 
insisted that he knows better than anyone else -whethe·r he was 
drinking at the time of the accident or not. And his position 
as to the brakes is absolutely corrobotated by Sergeant Hedrick, 
and Deputies Sheriffs Kanode and Poole. (R. pp. 6, 15, 1 6). 
On the foregoing statement of facts the court gave four in-
structions for the Commonwealth, which are on pages 26 and 
27 of the Record. These instructions were objected to by the 
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defendant and the reasons assigned for the objections follow 
the instructions in the Record. The court gave four instru-
tions for the defendant, (R. p. 29), which are largely incon-
sistent with those given for the Commonwealth, and refused 
one instruction, (R. p. 3 1), and exception was taken. 
The jury, by its verdict, found the defendant guilty of in-
voluntary manslaughter and fixed his punishment at four years 
in the penitentiary, upon which the court sentenced him, but 
before the sentence was imposed, and after the jury had been 
discharged, the defendant moved the court to set aside the ver-
dict and award the defendant a new trial, because the verdict 
was contrary to the law and the evid~nce. The grounds 
5 * upon which * this was ask are discussed under the assign-
ments of error herein. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
The court erred in instruction for the Commonwealth No. 
ONE. because it was simply an abstract statement of the legal 
definition of involuntary manslaughter, which as applied to a 
specific case is misleading and confusing. It is misleading and 
confusing in a case like this one to tell the jury in legal language 
that involuntary manslaughter is the killing of one accidentally, 
which in the understanding of the ordinary juror implies with-
out fault on the part cf the actor, then follows that with the 
words, "in the commissicn of some unlawful act", which implies 
that the actor is at fault because he is committing an unlawful 
act, or that he is performing a lawful act in an unlawful man-
ner, which he cannot reconcile with the word "accidentally", 
which last word of itself implies "without fault", and such an 
instruction is capable of directing his attention away from the 
important feature in the case of proximate cause and causal 
connection, the fault and the result. This court has often de-
precated and condemned the practice of using the language of 
decisions and legal writers in instructions, and in the recent 
case of News-Leader Co. v. Kocen, 173 Va. 95 ( 1 ro), Mr. 
Justice Hudgins condemns the practice and quotes from other 
decisions of this as follows: 
"The same idea was expressed by Mr. Justice Brown-
ing, in Snyder v. Fatherly, 158 Va. 335, 353 - in this 
language: 'we_ conceive that there may be a legal proposi-
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tion, perfectly sound as an abstract statement of law, but 
which would not be favored as an instruction to a jury for 
the reason that, in its form, unrelated to the evidence in the 
particular case, and unmodified to suit or fit the evidence, 
might mislead the jury and thus defeat its legitimate pur-
pose.'' 
And to the same effect is Hardyman v. Commonwealth•, 
153 Va. 954. 
That instruction in its abstract form leaves the jury unin-
formed with reference to the important feature of the case in re-
gard to whether the "unlawful act" was intentionally commit-
ted, or whether it was of such a character that an intent would 
be imputed to him, er whether it be a pure unavoidable accident 
fer which no one would be responsible. This position is 
not answered by ~aying that involuntary manslaughter 
6* does *not result from "intent". Of course, it could not be 
involuntary mam-laughter if the actor intended to kill, but 
when the courts say that intent does not enter into the case we 
apprehend that it is meant that the ultimate result need not be 
intended, or, in fact, must not be intended for if that were true 
then it would be voluntary mandaughter, or even murder. The 
true statement is that the killing must not be intended, but the 
act or omfr.sion which brings about the killing must be intended, 
or the act be cf such a character that an intent would be im-
puted. And if the act or omission which brings about the kill-
ing was not intended, or was not of such a character as that an 
intent would be imputed, then the killing would be the result 
of a pure unavoidable accident and would not be punishable at 
all. Nor cculd one perform a lawful act "unlawfully" with-
out an intention to do so. Of course, the act may be of such a 
character as that an intention would be imputed. But all o.f 
these things should be the subject of proper instructions to the 
jury, and net the legal definition of involuntary manslaughter 
r-erved up .cold to them and let them figure it out the best way 
they can. 
The above stated position is not without authority. There 
is little difference between assault and battery and involuntary 
manslaughter. At common law it was no higher dignity as a 
crime than assault and battery, and under our statutes it was 
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punishable just the same as assault and battery till the adoption 
of the Code of 1919. The same facts which would sustain a 
conviction of involuntary manslaughter would have constituted 
assault and battery if the person struck had not died. And in 
view of that the principles enunciated in Davis v. Commori-
wealth, 150 Va. 611, are controlling in the case at bar. That 
was a case of assault and battery, and the court reversed the case 
on account of the three instructions for the Commonwealth be-
ing erroneous in leaving out the element of intent. Instruction 
"C" also dealt with the question of intoxication which is perti-
nent to the case at bar. 
The elements of involuntary manslaughter are not changed 
7* by the Revision, *it is made a felony and the punishment 
changed. Many States define the cri:ne by statute and di-
~ide it into degrees, but in Virginia, it is just as it was at com-
mon law. And it is apparent from the Revisors Note to Sec. 
4 3 9 7 that the Revi.sors had in view the negligent operation of 
automobiles when involuntary manslaughter was elevated to a 
felony, but it certainly was never the intention to punish an un-
avoidable accident as a felony. At common law the offense 
was largely based on negligen.ce, if not entirely so, (on the 
theory that the violation of a statute may be negligence). And 
it seems that this court takes that view of it. for as was said 
by Mr. Chief Justice Prentis, in Goodman v. Commonwealth, 
153 Va. 943 and by Mr. Justice Spratley, in Bell v. Common-
wealth, 170 Va. 597: 
"The crime is imputed because of recklessness, and 
where there is no recklessness there is no crime." 
In the case at bar the defendant was being tried for reckless-
ness, and can only be convicted of recklessly killing Mrs. John-
son. He was not being tried for driving an automobile while 
under the influence of an intoxicant. If that is not the case he 
was indicted for one offense and tried for another. The viola-
tion of Sec. 4722, Michie's Code, 1942, if the defendant did 
violate it, was but an act tending to show negligence which 
would constitute the c.ffense for which he was being tried. 
(Railway Co. v. Haley, 156 Va. 350, 375, Quot. Elliott on 
Railroads). 
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It is submitted that the giving of the first instruction was 
error. 
THE SECOND INSTRUCTION. 
The fundamental principles in the discussion of this in-
struction have been largely discussed in the discussion of the 
first instruction. 
The second instruction is totally vicious. It assumes that 
the defendant was under the influence of intoxicants; it assumes 
that the truck struck and killed Mrs. Johnson. And it con-
tains the words, "and that such intoxication caused the· said ac-
cident" which was highly prejudicial and is error because there 
is no evidence whatever that the intoxication could .cause the 
death of Mrs. Johnson. It is not reasonable to say that the in-
toxication of one person can cause the death of another. 
8* It is possibly *true that an intoxicated person is more apt 
to do something to kill another than a sober person. The 
intoxicatiqn is too remote for the proximate cause, but would be 
admissible evidence tending to show negligence, that is to say 
the violation of a statute, but the violation of a statute, of 
itself. does not necessarily establish the· existence of proximate 
cause, (Gregc'rr:J v. Daoiel, 173 Va. 442 (445). 
And as we said in the case of State v. Frank, 5 1 Idaho 2 1; 
r Pac. (2d) 181, cited in note 99 A. L. R. at pages 816 and 17: 
"Conceding that this evidence is sufficient to sustain 
the inference that appellant was under the influence of in-
toxicating liquor -in some degree at the time of the accident, 
it is insufficient to sustain the further inference that his 
condition was such that he did not have full possession of 
all his faculties, or that his driving while under the influ-
ence of intoxicating liquor was the proximate cause of the-
accident.'' 
In the ca~e at bar the substantial charge is reckless driving, 
and the proximate cause must necessarily be reckless driving, 
but proximate cause cannot be established by" the proof of a fact 
tending to prove re.ckless driving. The Commonwealth is set-
ting up two proximate causes in two separate instructions both 
of which are binding. instructions; the second instruction sets 
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up intoxication as the proximate cause, and the third instruc-
tion, which is also a binding instruction, sets up reckless driv-
ing as the proximate cause. Under the second instruction the 
jury could find, and in fact W€re instructed to find, the de-
fendant guilty irrespective of reckless driving. This instruc-
tion was given in the face of the uncontradicted fact that the 
defective brake was the cause of the truck g·etting out of con-
trol, and which misfortune might have happened to a perfect-
ly sober man. We say this is uncontradicted because it is not 
contradicted. The defendant says it was the defective brake, 
and he is corroborated by the three officers. Hedrick, Kanode, 
and Poole. The defendant had driven that truck all that day 
with no untoward incident till he reached the curve in the road 
three hundred yards from the bridge where they first begin to 
go bad and the truck got completely out of his control about 
one hundred feet from the bridge. 
9* * Another_ serious objection to this second instruction is, 
that if it is true, and we think that it is eminently true, that 
the alleged intoxication is only an element in the case tending to 
prc-ve negligence and reckless driving, is that it singles out and 
gives emphasis to this one feature of the evidence. (Woods v. 
Commonwealth, 171 Va. 543). 
Further discussing this second instruction; it might be .con-
tended that it finds support in what this court said in Massie 
v. Commonwealth, 1 77 Va. 88 3, but it does not when the rec-
crd in that case is examined. That case was submitted to the 
jury on the correct theory, and the verdict appears to have been 
rnppcrted bv the evidence. If we look at instruction No. 2 in 
the case at bar and then look at the instruction given in the 
Massie Case we observe the differen.ce. The instruction given in 
the Massie CaS'!!, given for the Commonwealth was as follows: 
"The court instructs the jury that if they shall be-
lieve from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant while under the influence of intoxicants, or 
whether intoxicated or not, drove his car in a reckless 
manner, in disregard of human life, resulting in the death 
of Della Couch, he is guilty of involuntary manslaughter 
and the jury should so find and fix his punishment etc., 
etc.'' 
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Plainly the trial court and this court were of the opinion 
that the alleged intoxication of the defendant in that case was 
but an element entering in reckless driving. The trial court did 
-not undertake to say that if the defendant was drunk then they 
should find the defendant guilty in any event, but looking at the 
opinion of this .court, aside from the record, it came very near 
to saying it, In the Massie Case, this court said: 
''The evidence of the Corhmonwealth discloses that 
the accused was operating the car under the influence of 
alcohol at the time Della Couch was killed. He was vio-
lating the terms o.f Code, Sec. 4722, which thereby rende·r-
ed his conduct unlawful. The evidence supports the ver-
dict.,. 
It is submitted that the court was dealing specifically with 
the facts of that case, and that it did not mean to eliminate the 
element of proximate cause in this class of cases, and that the 
reckless driving was the proximate cause. If the court did 
ro* mean that then it is overruling Davis *v. Common-
wealth, 150 Va. 61 r: Brooks v. Commonwealth, 145 V4. 
853; Goodman v. Commonwealth, 153 Va. 943; Bell v. Com-
monwealth, 170 Va. 597, and running counter to the great 
weight of authority, which we do not think it was the intention 
of the court to do. 
The giving of the second instruction was etror. 
THE THIRD INSTRUCTION. 
The defendant assigns .as error the giving of the third in-
struction because it is incomplete, insufficient and misleading. 
It is a binding instruction leaving the jury to speculate as 
to whether tbe defendant was "recklessly, negligently, and care-
lessly driving a trucktt without calling attention to any facts 
shown by the evidence tending to show negligence or reckless-
ness. As, indeed, is the fact that there was no evidence of reck-
1e~~ness, negligence or carelessness, because the uncontradicted 
fact was that the accident was occasioned by the failure of the 
brake to work. Such conclusion could only be reached by the 
ultimate consequences, which under the elastic instruction the 
jury was at liberty to do. It failed to distinguish an act inten-
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tionally done and a pure accident without fault upon the part 
of the driver. It did not distinguish between proximate cause 
and the ultimate result. It permits the jury to substitute its 
opinion for and in the place of the rules of law. 
Giving it was error. 
DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION REFUSED. 
After the fo~r instructions were given for the· Common-
wealth certain instructions were given at the instance of the 
defendant, (R. p. 29) but those given for the defendant do not 
remedy the situation created by the Commonwealth's instruc-
tions, the second and third of which are binding instructions 
and are contradictory of each other and inconsistent with those 
given for the defendant. 
The one instruction which did undertake to tell the jury 
that they must distinguish between a pure· a.ccident and an in-
tentional act of the defendant was refused. It was as follows: 
r 1 * *''The court instructs the jury that before they can 
convict the defendant they must believe from the evidence 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged killing was the 
result of some negligent act, or acts, of the defendant in-
tentionally done, and the defendant can not be convicted if 
the death was occasioned by me.chanical defect in said truck 
er mere inadvertence for which the defendant was not re-
sponsible." 
The demand for this instruction was evoked by the nature 
of the case and the evidence in it, and it is not covered by any 
other instruction which was given. The evidence did not show 
reckless driving unless the verdict could be based upon the infer-
ence from the mere fact of the death of Mrs. Johnson. The 
evidence does show that the brake was the cause of the trouble, 
and the defendant's testimony is corroborated by the three of-
ficers who testified in the case. This instruction should have 
been given coupling together the question of intent with the 
fact of the defective brake. 
If it be granted that the truck was running wild, that does 
not make the offense. It must be shown that it was being run 
recklessly by the defendant. If it was cut of the control of the 
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driver it was not being driven recklessly. It was not being 
driven at all if it was out of control against the will of the 
driver. 
The refusal of this instruction in its form does not con-
clude the matter. If it was not correct in form then the court 
should have given an instruction covering the theory embodied, 
which it was asked to do, but did not. (DeJamett'e v. Com-
monwealth, 75 Va. 867; State v. Brown, 107 W. Va. 60, 146 
S. E. 887. 
It was error for the court to fail and refuse to instruct the 
jury on this theory. 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE VERDICT. 
The court erred in not setting aside the verdict because of 
the giving of the three instructions hereinbefore discussed. It 
was error to refuse the instruction offered by the defendant. 
And the court erred in not setting aside the verdict because 
of the misconduct of J. A. Newton, a juror trying the case. 
Tbe fact with regard this are r.et forth beginning en page 
1 2 * 3 3 of the Record, and are that * Mr. Newton .conversed, 
no one else being present, with Sergeant E. B. Hedr:ck, a 
witness for the Commonwealth who had testified prior to the 
adjournment of the court late in the afterncon, concerning his 
testimony in the case. This took place on the street in Pearis-
burg after Hedrick had testified. The subject of the conversa-
tion was Hedrick's cross-examination. It is shown that Hed-
rick when he took the stand in the case had a tablet of paper 
from which he was testifying, and on cross-examination he 
was asked why he had taken these notes and he said that he 
did it so that he could remember the things to which he was to 
testify on the trial. The witness argued that he knew he would 
be a witness, although he was out of the county on the day of 
the accident, and knew nothing about the ca~e but what he had 
gotten from other people and observations on the scene after 
the event. The cross examination was, of course, intended to 
shew his interest in the case and the laborious preparation he 
had made to procure a conviction in it. His friend, Mr. New-
ton, conversed with him during the trial concerning the inci-
dent and remarked to Hedrick "of course you have to take 
notes etc.''" 
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That there had been communication between Hedrick and 
the juror was known to counsel prior to the verdict, because 
just before court opened on the day the trial was completed the 
juror said in the hearing of counsel that he had talked to Hed-
rick concern his testimony, but the extent of the conversation 
was not known because counsel did not speak to the juror and 
only heard his remark because it was physically impos~ible not 
to hear them. 
It came out in the evidence of the defendant, who was the 
last witness to testify, that Hedrick on the same occasion that he 
had called the defendant "a damned liar", had told him that. 
"Mr. Newton said that you had been called to the army, to go 
on the 8th day of August, and you know you killed that wo-
man to keep from having to go to the army." (R. p. 24) 
Neither Hedrick, Sheriff Johnston, or Deputy Poole denied this 
statement of the witness; either Johnston or Poole was 
13 present when it was made. All these. *men were in the 
court room heard the statement and none were called to 
deny it. Mr. Newton, doubtless, knew that it was true and 
they could not deny it. The circumstances raise strong infer-
ences that Hedrick and Newton had talked about the case at the 
time it happened because Newton was Secretary-Treasurer of 
the Hospital in which Mrs. Johnson died and Hedrick in his 
elaborate preparation doubtless took in the Hospital in making 
his memoranda. Newton was also Chairman of the Giles 
County Selective Service Board and Hedrick would naturally 
inquire as to the defendant's status in the Draft, and the Chair-
man would be the one to whom he would go. 
The last case dealing with a situation like this is the Pitch-
ford Case, 135 Va. 654. (the Henson case, 165 Va. 821 is not 
to the point). In the Pitchford Case a juror was seen talking 
to a Commonwealth's. witness during the trial, but it did not 
even appear what they were talking about. It was not shown 
that they were talking about the case. Judge Sims delivered the 
opinion and among other things said: 
"As a private communication between a witness for 
the Commonwealth with a member of the jury during the 
trial of the case was established by the evidence introduced 
upon the motion . for a new trial, without conflict in such 
evidence, and the harmlessness of such communication is 
r 4 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
not made or even sought to be made to appear by any evi-
dence in the record, the verdict can not stand.'' 
In that case it was not known what was the subject of con-
versation between the juror and the witness, but in the present 
case it is shown and not denied that they were joking about the 
testimony of the main witness for the Commonwealth, and the 
juror manifesting his agreement with the witness as to the pro-
priety of taking and making a record from which to testify 
months hence. In the case of Mattox x. U. S. I 46 U. S. r 40, it 
is said and Judge Sims quotes it in the Pitchford Case: 
"Private communications possibly prejudicial between 
jurors and third persons or witnesses ... are absolutely for-
bidden, and invalidate the verdict, unless their harmless-
ness is made to appear." 
''Unless their harmlessness be made to appear" evidently 
means that if they were not talking about the .case, but on an-
other subject, they would not invalidate the verdict. But 
r 4 how could it be harmless when they were * talking and 
agreeing about the witness's testimony in the case then 
being tried? 
The refusal to set aside the verdict for that reason is error. 
The rule is not different from the rule against entertainment of 
jurors or commissioners, and entertainment and communication 
bas been condemned in New River Etc. R. Co. v. Honaker, 119 
Va. 641, and Va~ Westem· Power Co. v. Kessinger, 122 Va. 
135. The underlying reason for the rules is stated by Judge 
Sims quot'ing the Chief Justice of Georgia, who said: 
"Where, during the trial of a criminal case, the jury 
dispersed and one of them was entertained at dinner free of 
charge by an attorney for the State, su.c'h conduct on the 
part of the latter is cause for a new trial, although the 
counsel for the accused knew o-f the same before the verdict 
had been returned. In such cases the trial court should not, 
and· this court will not, inquire whether injury resulted to 
the accused or not, but the verdict, upon principles of 
sound public policy, will be set aside, to the end that the 
purity of jury trial may be preserved unimpaired.H 
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The mere fact that counsel for the defendant knew before 
verdict that there had been some .communication between the 
juror and the witness will not serve to restore and preserve the 
confidence of the public in jury trials. The only thing to re-
store and preserve it is a condemnation of the occurrence and the 
direction of a new trial on account of it. The rule is ba&ed 
upon public policy and this is the occasion to enforce it. 
THE VERDICT IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE 
As hereinbefore contended the whole unfortunate occur-
rence came from defective brakes and which failed to work at 
a crucial time. The evidence does not show beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant was under the influence of an intoxi-
.cant. but if that had been shown. it is not shown beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the accident would not have happened 
anyway. The lightning is just as apt to strike a drunk man as 
a sober one. and vice versa, and a brake is as apt to go bad for a 
man who has had a drink as for one who has not. That the 
brake did go bad is not denied. That that was the cause of the 
truck getting out of control can not be denied. The only thing 
on which the verdict rests is the allegation that he was drink-
ing, and there is not a particle of evidence to show that that 
15 * '!cwas the proximate .cause. 
CONCLUSION. 
Your petitioner therefore prays that a writ of error and 
supersedeas may be awarded him to the said judgment, and that 
the record in the said proceeding before this court be caused to 
come. and that upon a hear'ing the said judgment may be an-
nulled and set aside, the verdict of the jury set aside, and the de ... 
fondant awarded a new trial. And he will ever pray etc. 
W. B. SNIDOW, 
Pearisburg, Virginia 
JAMES L. WARREN, 
Narrows, Virginia. 
HOMER ALBERT. 
By His Attorneys. 
I. W. B. Snidow, an attorney at law practicing in the 
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Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, do hereby certify that in 
my opinion the judgment of the Circuit Court of Giles County, 
in the case of Commonwealth vs. Homer Albert, should be re-
viewed by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia; and I do 
further certify that I have this day delivered a .copy of this peti-
tion to J. Livingstone Dillow, Commonwealth's Attorney of 
Giles County, and who prosecuted this case in the trial thereof, 
and also advised him that I was immediately filing the same 
with the Clerk o.f the said Supreme Court of Appeals at Rich-
mond, and that in the event that a writ of error is granted that 
I shall use the aforesaid petition as the opening brief in the argu-
ment of the case in the said court. 
_ Given under my hand this the 30th day of December, 
1942. 
Received January 4, 1943. 
W. B. SNIDOW, 
Attor:ney for the Petitioner 
Pearisburg, Virginia 
M. B. WATTS. 
Clerk. 
January 18, 1943. Writ of error and supersedeas award-
ed by the court. No bond. 
March 1, 1943. Writ dismissed for failure to pay writ 
tax. 
April 23, 1943. Dismission set aside and case reinstated. 
M.B.W. 
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RECORD 
Commonwealth of Virginia 
vs. Felony 
Homer Albert 
Pleas before the Circuit Court of the County of Giles, on 
September 17th, 1942. 
Be it remembered that heretofore, to-wit: 
On the 15th day of September, 1942, being the first day 
of the September term, 1942, of said Court, the Grand Jury in 
and for the body of the County of Giles, then attending said 
Court, returned an indictment against the said defendant Homer 
Albert, which Indictment and all' proceedings had thereon in 
said Court, are in words and figures following, to-wit: 
INDICTMENT. 
Commonwealth of Virginia, 
County of Giles, to-wit: 
In the Circuit Court of the said County, September Term, 
1942. 
The Grand Jurors of The Commonwealth of Virginia, in 
and for the body of the County of Giles, impanelled and sworn 
at the term hereof, commencing on the 15th day of September, 
r 942, and now attending upon the said court, upon their oaths 
present that Homer Albert in the said county on the day 
of July. 1942, did unlawfully and feloniously kill and slay one. 
Lydie Ward Davidson Johnson against the peace and dignity 
cf the Commonwealth of Virginia. 
Upon the evidence of William Earl Johnson, J. H. 
page 2 r Poole and G. P. Stoutamyer, witnesses sworn in. 
open court and sent to the Grand Jury to give evi-
dence. 
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And in said Court the I 7th day of September, I 942. 
This day came the Commonwealth by her Attornt!y, and 
the defendant in person and by Counsel. And the defendant 
moved the Court that the Attorney for the Commonwealth 
furnish a Bill of Particulars, and the Court doth sustain the 
motion and the Bill of Particulars was accordingly furnished 
by the Attorney for the Common.wealth, and filed, and upon 
being arraigned the defendant pleaded not guilty to the charge 
in the indictme.nt, . to-wit: Unlawfully and feloniously kill 
and slay one Ward Lydia Davidsen Johnston; thereupon came a 
jury, who had been summoned, sele.cted and tried as prescribed 
by law, to-wit: C. C. Philpott, S. A. Bradley, L. V. Porter-
field, J. T. Rogers, 0. ~rooks Johnson, Noel E. Pruett, V. 
Robert Huffman, J. A. Newton, S. E. Ould, Frank Bell, J. 
Kent Eaton and Earl Gawthrop, who were sworn and impanel-
ed in the manner prescribed by law, and who after hearing the 
evidence, receiving instructions from the Court, and hearing 
argument· of Counsel, retired to their room to consider of their 
verdict, and after awhile returm?d into Court and rendered the 
fellowing verdict: · "We the jury find the c1.efendant guilty as 
charged in the within indictment, and fix his punishment at 
four years in the· State Penitentiary. L. V. Porter-
page 3 ~ field, Foreman." 
Upon the jury being discharged from the case, the 
defendant moved the Court to set aside the verdict of the jury, 
because the same was contrary to law and the evidence, mis-
direction and refusal of the Court to give instructions asked by 
tbe defei:idant, and misconduct of a juror during the trial, there-
upoIJ the juror in question was examined in open Court under 
hi~ oath .tcpcbin~ said alleged misconduct. The Court upon con-
r.ide_ration thereof, is of the. opinion to, and doth overrule the 
motion, and defendant excepte.d. 
It is therefore considered and ordered by the Court that the 
defendant. Homer Albert, be confined in the State Penitentiary 
~er a term of four years, in accor4ance with the verdict of the 
Jury. 
. The defendant expressing a desire to a"pply to the Court of 
Appeals for a writ of error, execution of the sentence is sus-
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E. B. Hedrick 
pended for a period of sixty days, and the Court fixed the bond 
of the defendant at $4000.00, and the defendant not being able 
to give bond at this time, he is remanded to jail. 
Said sentence to be credited wit}:l 5 days spent in jail await-
ing trial. 
EVIDENCE 
The f/oUowiing was in substance the evij1ience for the 
Commonwealth in chief: 
page 4 ~ E. B. HEDRICK, a witness for the Commonwealth, 
stated that he was Sergeant of the State Police Force 
and that he was not in the County on the day that the alleged 
offense was committed, but that on the following day he did 
make an investigation in regard to the occurrence; that he went 
to the scene of the accident and from information received from 
others, and from the markings on the bridge, it appeared that 
the truck alleged to have been driven by Albert, the defendant, 
struck Mrs. Johnson about 397 feet from the East end of the 
Ripplemead Bridge across New River, in Giles County: that 
there were signs o.f the truck having run against and into the 
railing of said bridge on its right hand side, about 60 feet from 
where the truck struck Mrs. Johnson, that the curbing was 
ocru bbed for 6 1 · feet on the right hand side, coming west, and 
these marks began r 1 2 steps from the east end of the bridge: 
that said bridge is about I ooo feet long and is 23 feet wide, the 
guard rail, which is a concrete wall, is about 4 feet high, and 
there is a curb at the base of the guard rail about 8 inches in 
width and 12 inches high. After having viewed the scene he 
then went into the jail along with Sheriff Johnston and talked 
to the defendant, Homer Albert; that he was particular to tell 
him that he didn't have to talk unless he wanted to, and that 
anything that be said might be used against him c-n his trial. 
and after having so informed the defendant, he had two inter-
views with the defendant: that at the first interview, the said 
defendant, Homer Albert, told him that -if ·he struck anybody 
he did not know ·it, but he admitted he was driving 
page 5 r the truck on this occasion; that the machinery or the 
brakes of bis truck was out of order, and had gotten 
20 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
E. B~ Hedrick 
beyond his control; that he was not under the influence ·of an 
intoxicant at the time of the wreck, but that he drank three 
glasses of wine at Sibold' s about fifteen minutes before being 
arrested, and after the accident had occurred, and that he had 
had nothing to drink before that. That he had another inter-
view with the defendant at the jail next day, and the defendant 
then told him he drank 2 or 3 drinks of whiskey and one drink 
of wine about one hour prior to the accident, and that if he 
struck anybody. he was so drunk he didn't know it; that he did 
not see Mrs. Johnson; that Albert said he lost control of the 
truck by the brakes failing to work, which were hydraulic 
brakes, and; that there was a considerable grade coming down 
toward the river as the road approached the bridge; that the 
said truck was loaded with 6 tons of gravel, which he was haul-
ing from Pembroke Limestone Works to the bridge construction 
work at Pearisburg Station of the Norfolk and Western Rail-
way; that this trip was the 6th load he had hauled that day; 
that he had had no trouble with the operation of the said truck 
until on that day; 
On cross examination, the witness Hedrick, was asked what 
it was that he was reading from, he on the stand having in his 
hand a tablet of paper, and stated that it was several pages of 
notes which he had taken at the scene of the accident, and of his 
two conversations with the defendant while in jail, on the day 
following, and the day after that, the accident; and 
page 6 r being asked what was his purpose in keeping notes 
of those· conversatic-ns he answered, so that he could 
remember when he should be called to testifv on a trial against 
the defendant, and upon being asked whether or not he had 
made an examination of the· truck alleged to have been driven 
by the defendant after the accident, he stated that he had made 
an examination of the truck and that it was equipped with 
hydraulic brakes and that they were defective when the truck 
was found between the town c.f Pearisburg and Bluff City, and 
that the officers required it . to be brought into a garage by a 
wrecker and that he ·would not permit the said truck to be 
driven over the roads under. its own power in such conditions: 
that when the brake was first applied by the foot that the pedal 
would go to the floor board, without any resistance, but that if 
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the foot pedal was pumped two or three times, then there was 
resistance. On re-direct examination, the witness said if the 
· truck got away on the hill east of the bridge, the driver could 
go on up Stony Creek road and not turn into the bridge. 
WILLIAM E. JOHNSON, another witness for the Com-
mon w~alth, testified that he was 35 years old and was the hus-
band c.f the deceased, Lydia Johnson, who was 3 2 and that he 
was with her on the· Ripplenieade Bridge, in Giles County, Vir-
ginia, on the 27th day o.f July, I 942, along between six and 
seven c/ clock in the afternoon when she was struck by a truck 
being driven by Homer Albert, the defendant, 
page 7 r knocked down and rendered unconscious, from 
which accide·rtt she died art hour c-r so thereafter at 
the hospital in Pe·arisburg where she was brought immediately 
after she was hurt; that they were living at Ripplemead on the 
West side of New River, near the western end of said bridge; 
that they were going across the rive·r Qn the that particular even-
ing for the purpose of looking at a house they were proposing 
to rent; that just before they got to the point where she was 
stiruck they had both stopped on their right hand side of the 
bridge and leaned over the guard rail, watching some young 
people bathing in New River, and had crossed to their left side 
of the bridge and were proceeding on eastward when she was 
etruck by this truck; that he first observed· the truck when it 
was about 50 feet from them, that they were walking single 
fil,e close to the curb, witb his wife: in front; that the truck was 
running. 45 or 5 o miles an hour: that it looked like the driver· 
~wun-g the frcnt end ove-r towards Illy wife and- I said "Look 
out he is going. to hit- you" and it hit her a-nd ran over her. They 
were then about 3 oo feet from the east- end· of the b.ridge, that he 
climbed up on the cur-band was not hit by the truck, but it tore· 
his clothes and caused him to fall; that his wife was knocked 
down and rolled some distance on the bridge; that after that, 
not more than a, minute or two, an automobile driven by a m·en 
wbom witness· afterward- learned was Mr. Vest, drove up, and 
he asked- him to take his wife to the hospital, which he kindly 
did! and where she died a short while after her arrival there: 
that the truck went en to the west end of the bridge 
page 8 ~ and stopped; that the defendant did not bring the 
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truck back, and if he ever got out of it, he did not see 
him: that it was daylight and a dry day, and there was no one 
else on the bridge at the time. 
JOHN VEST, another witness for the Commonwealth, 
testified that he was driving an automobile from Pembroke to 
Pearisburg, on the evening of July 27th, 1942, and as he came 
upon the east end of the Ripplemeade Bridge he saw Mr. John-
son and Mrs. Johnson, the latter lying down on the bridge, and 
as he drove up Mr. Johnson told him that she had been struck 
by a truck and was badly hurt, and asked him if he would take · 
her on tc Pearisburg to the hospital, which the witness agreed 
to do, and did do: that he passed the truck on the west end of 
the bridge and it was backing up: that Mrs. Johnson was taken 
to St. Elizabeth's Hospital ·by him, at Pearisburg, where he 
understood that she died a few minutes after their arrival; and; 
that in his automobile with the deceased was Mr. Johnson, her 
husband. 
W. T. MAcMAHAN. JR., a witness for the Common-
wealth, testified tbat he lived at Pembroke in Giles County, and 
that on the evening of the 27th day of July, 1942, he was com-
ing from Pembrcke to Pearisburg in his automobile, that he left 
Pembroke around 7 o'clcck to attend a F. P. F. meeting, in car 
with Jimmy Mc-ntgomery, and, that he passed the truck being 
driven by Homer Albert about I oo feet from the· east end of the 
Ripplemeade Bridge, at which time the said truck 
page 9 r was being driven about 3 0 miles an hour; that there 
were no curves between them and the bridge after 
they passed the truck, · and the road was not steep from that 
point, but that there was some grade, and, that prior to passing 
the said truck he had followed it for some distance and it weav-
ed a little bit, but not so terribly bad; that it was not out from 
under control. After passing the truck he drove on across the 
bridge, and about 1 / 4 of the way across the bridge they passed 
Mr. and Mrs. Johnsen, who were walking up against the curb-
ing en the left of hte bridge: and when near the end of the west· 
end of the bridge he heard a noise and looked back, and saw the 
deceased rolling on the bridge crumpled up, and her husband 
Homer Albert vs. Commonwealth of Virginia 23 
Leonard Hill, colored 
near by, about a third of the way across from the east end of 
the bridge. 
Witness then drove a.ff the bridge and turned around, in-
tending to go pack to the scene of the accident, and did go back, 
but before he got there Mrs. Johnson had been picked up by the 
Vest car and they were on their way to the hospital, and; that 
returning to the west end of the bridge, the truck which had 
been driven by Albert was being backed slowly on said bridge 
from the west end toward the scene of the accident, that it 
backed up may be 3 o feet, but tha.t he did not know. who was 
then driving it as he didn't notice. 
ALEX WATSON, colored, testified that on the 27th day 
cf July, 1942, that he and Leonard hill, anoth~r col,o~~d boy,. 
got on the truck driven by Homer Albert, about three· o'clock in 
the afternoon at Sibold's Store at Pembroke, about one-half 
mile from the Limestone Plant and. rode to Pearisburg, .a dis-
tance of about seven miles, with Albert: that he and 
page IO t Hill got out of the truck at Pearisburg while Albert 
. . went on to Bluff City with a load of stone; that 
he and Hill each bc·ught a pint of liquor at the A. B. C. Store at 
Pearfrburg: that they got back en the truck with Albert at Pear-
ir.burg, and rode back to Limestone Plant w:ith him; that Watson. 
and Hill each drank Hqucr from their bottles, but tnat Albert 
did not drink liquor; that Albert wanted to get a drink of water 
at the Limestone Plant and asked Leonard Hill to back the 
truck under the loading pit, which Hill ·di.cl.:· that after the 
truck was l~aded, that he, Hill and Albert, ·got back into the 
truck and drove the truck away f~om the Limes~one Plant: that .. 
he got out of the truck at Sibold's Store, and: that.Albert drov~ 
the truck on into the direction of Pearisburg; and when he 
last saw Albert it was about six o'dock: that he looked like· he 
bad had a drink; but he drove all right then. On cross-exami-
nation, he stated Albert looked like a man who had had a drink; 
that he acted a little different from the way he is acting now. 
LEONARD HILL, colored, testified that on the 27th day 
cf July, 1942, that he and Alex Watson, another colored boy, 
get· on the truck driven by Homer Albert, about three o'clock 
i4 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Theodore Lafon 
in the afternoon at Si bold' s Store at Pembroke, about one-half 
mile from the Limestone Plant, and rode to Pearisburg, a dis-
tance of about seven miles, with Albert; that he and Watson 
got out of the truck at Pearisburg while Albert went on to Bluff 
City with a load of stone; that he and Watson each bought a 
pint of liquor at the A. B. C. Store at Pearisburg; that they got 
back on the truck with Albert at Pearisburg, and rode back to 
the Limestone Plant with him; that Hill and Wat-
page 1 1 ~ son each drank liquor from their bottles, but that 
Albert did not drink liquor; that Albert wanted to 
get a drink of water at the Limestone Plant and asked him to 
back the truck under the loading pit, which he did; that after 
the_ tnick was loaded that Watson, Albert and he got back into 
the truck; and, that Albert drove the truck away from the Lime-
stone Plant; that Watson and he got off of the truck at Sibold's 
Store, and; that Albert drove the truck on into the· direction of 
Pearisburg; that he might have been drinking, but he .couldnt t 
swear to it: that he was driving all right when he left there·. 
THEODORE LAFON. another witne.ss for the Ce:;,mmon-
wealth, testified that he worked for the Pembroke Limestone 
Corporation;. t_hat on the 27th day of July, 1942, Homer Al-
bert was driving a truck ba.uling gravel from the works to 
Pearisburg Bridge; that, in the evening when he came back 
from the last load which he hauled that day, and was around the 
works that he bad seen Leonard Hill back bis truck back into 
the_ place to be loaded;. that be saw the truck leave the scales, 
and that it. was driven by the defendant Albert;. that he was 
about five feet from him; that be saw him before he got in the 
truck;_ that he looked like he had been drinking; that he stag-
gered or. limped; that he wasn't in any shape to drive; that the 
truck wiggled as it dtc-ve off:. that it was then. dose to seven 
o'c;lock; that somebody had told him that the defendant, Al-
bert, was drunk; that in his opinion he was either drunk or 
craz1; that he .himself could. not say whether he 
page I 2 r was or not; but,· that after having seen the defend-
a•nt and. knowing that he was in n0 condici0n to 
drive· the· truck, he· went to: the tel'ephone and called Albert's 
employer, Whitey Collins, the owner of the track, and told him 
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that Homer Albert was d.runk and that he had better get him 
off of the truck, but witness could not remember who gave him 
the information, and; that that was all that he knew about it. 
CHAP MEREDITH, another witness for the Common-
wealth, testified that he was employed by the Pembroke Works; 
that on the evening c.f the 27th day of July, 1942, he was at 
said works and saw the said defendant; that he saw Leonard 
Hill back the truck into the place to be loaded, and presently 
r.aw the defendant .come up to the truck and get in it and drive 
it off; that he looked to him like he was partly drunk; that he 
saw him about 6:oo or 6:30; that the defendant lived right 
next to him and he had known him ever since he was a kid. On 
cross examination he testified that the defendant just looked 
like a drunk man that his face was red: that something was 
wrong with him; that he was crazy or drunk one; that he look-
ed then like he does not, but that he drove the truck all right. 
VIRGIL FISHER, another witness for the Common-
wealth, testified that he worked fo.r the Ripplemead Lime Com-
pany. whose operation is located at the west end of the Ripple-
meade Bridge along the highway toward Pearisburg; that on 
the evening of the 27th day of July, 1942, he was 
page I 3 r at work direct! y at the west end o.f said bridge, at 
a point where he could see into the bridge; that he 
did not see the accident which had occurred about six hundred 
feet from where he was, but could see where it happened, and 
that he beard the truck hit the bridge, and; that the truck came 
df the bridge and pulled on up the road a little piece, and then 
backed back and asked two boys who were standing at the end 
of the bridge where I was if they wanted to· ride to town, that 
tbey told him that they did not want to go, and then Mr. Col-
Hns. the owner of the truck, drove around in front of him. The 
truck was then fixing to pull out. Collins stopped the truck. 
took the defendant off the truck and put him in his car, and put 
anotb.er driver in the truck, that it looked to him like the boy he 
took cut cf the truck was drunk: he couldn't walk straight; 
they went on back toward Pembroke; that the witness was right 
at them: that the boy staggered when he walked from the truck 
tc Collins' car. 
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J. H. POOLE, a witness for the Commonwealth, testified 
that he was Se,rgeant of the Town of Pearisburg an Deputy 
Sheriff of Giles County; that after the accident on the Ripple-
meade bridge where Mrs. Johnson was struck and mortally 
wounded by the truck driven by Homer Albert, that he and 
Deputy Sheriff Kanode, followed the truck which was then 
being driven by a man named Fain, and found the truck on its 
return froq1 Pearisburg Bridge, between Pearisburg 
page 14 r Station and the Town of Pearisburg; and, that 
upon examination of the said truck he found that 
the hydraulic brakes on the said truck were so defective and 
out of order, and in such a bad condition, that he and Deputy 
Sheriff Kanode, both refused to allow the said truck to be driven 
for about a mile's distance to a garage in the town of Pearis-
burg, because of the faulty condition of the brakes; that he in 
company with Mr. Kanode went to Pembroke and found the 
defendant on the highway between Sibold's Store and his 
father's home, going toward his home; and, that they arrested 
him for this 'c.ffense, about 7 :45 or 7: 50, at which time he was 
very drunk; that he examined the place of accident on the bridge 
and found a lady's shoe and a mark on the railing; that he saw 
tbe marks on the bridge coping and a pool of blood at the end 
of the mark, on the left hand side of the bridge. 
C. W. KANODE, another witness for the Commonwealth. 
testified that he· was Deputy Sheriff of Giles County, and that 
he was with Mr. Poole, who had testified; and, that upon exam-
ination of the truck not more than an hour after the accident, 
that he found tbe brakes on the said truck defective, out of 
order; that he stepped on the brake pedal and it went to the 
floor; that after working it up and down 3 or 4 timet: it 
caught; that they were in such a condition that he and Mr. 
Poole required the truck to be conveyed to a garage in the town 
of Pearisburg by a wrecker, not thinking it safr that 
page I 5 r it should be operated under its OWn power; that he 
in company with Mr. Poole, went to Pembroke 
and found the defendant on the highway between Sibold' s Store 
and his father's home, about 3 miles from the s.cene of the ac-
cident, going toward his home, about 3 5 minutes after the 
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accident; and, that they arrested him for this offense, at which 
time he was very drunk, staggering drunk; that the truck had 
struck the curb of the bridge and followed it 23 steps, that there 
was a pool of blood about two inches from the curb and about 
2/3 of the way of the 23 steps coming west. 
DOCTOR W. C. CAUDILL, another witness for the 
Commonwealth, testified that he was a physician and conducted 
St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Pearisburg; that on the 27th day of 
July, 1942, Mrs. Lydia Johnson was brought to· his hospital 
r-uffering from wounds, bruises, lacerations and shock, said 
to have been received from a truck running against her: that 
r.be died within a few minutes after having been brought to the 
hospital; and, that her death was unquestionably caused by the 
injuries received from being struck by the truck. 
The foregoing was in substance all of the evidence for the 
Cemmonwealth in chief. 
And the following is in substance all of the evi-
page I 6 r dence for the defendant: 
GORDON ALBERT, a witness for the defendant, testi-
fied that he was the father of Homer Albert, the defendant; 
that his said son lived with him at his home at Pembroke: which 
was a few hundred yards up the Little Stony Creek Road from 
the Post Office at Pembroke; that his said son was employed 
as a truck driver by Mr. Ccllins: and, that he was at work for 
Mr. Collins on the 27th day of July, r 942; that late in the 
evening of that day, his said rnn returned home along about 
six o'clock with Mr. Collins, in Collins' automobile, and got out 
and came up and sat en the porch; that the witness could see 
that there was something wrong about the boy: that be seem-
ed to be nervous, excited and greatly depres~ed, that he asked 
Collins what was the matter with the boy, was he drunk, and 
Collins said he didn't think be was drunk: and witness asked 
the defendant what was the matter, and he stated that he 
thought he had hit somebody with the truck down on the 
bridge, but that he didn't know whether be had or not. that he 
didn't see them; that at that time and when his .son came home 
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that he was not under the influence of an intoxicant; and, that 
he had not been drinking at all, but; that shortly after his con-
versation with him on the po·rch, the boy did go into the house 
and drink some whiskey, evidently a considerable quantity, for 
shortly thereafter he was very much under the in-
page I 7 r fluence of it, and after he had been at home for 
something like an hour, he walked down the road 
to Mr. Si bold' s Ste re, and around seven or eight o'clock he was 
brought back to the house by Deputy Sheriff Kanode, at which 
time the boy was considerably under the influence of the whis-
key he had drunk, and the witness also believes that the boy 
said he had drunk a bottle of beer down at Sibold' s Store; that 
the Deputy Sh~riff told the witness what had occurred, and the 
boy was brought on to jail that night; and, that witness did 
not come to Pearisburg on that evening, but did come· to see 
the boy early the next day; that it was too late at that hour to 
arrange bail for him on that night, and he deferred the matter 
for a few days. 
0. M. COLLINS, a witness for the defendant, te('tified 
that he was the cwner of the truck. a 194 I model Ford dump 
truck, being driven by Herner Albert on the day of the acci-
dent: that he had a contract hauling gravel from the Pembroke 
Limestone Works for the construction of the bridge across New 
River at Pearisburg Station; that the defendant, Albert, had 
been working fer him for some time: that late in the evening 
of the 27th day of July. 1942, someone calfod him on the tele-
phone; that he didn't at that time recognize who it was, and 
whoever it was didn't say who it was, but tbe purport of the 
mes~age received by witne~s was that Homer Albert was drunk 
and that he had better get him off of that truck, which informa-
tion of course somewhat excited and angered him; 
page 1 8 ~ and. that he called Mr. Fain, another young man 
1 
who was one of his drivers, and took him in his 
autc.mobile and over took the truck backing up on the west end 
of the bridge at Ripplemeade. He stopped his automobile im-
mediately behind the truck on the bridge, got out and went to 
the driver's teat and told Albert, tbe defendant, to get out. 
which he did; that he put Fain in to drive the truck and he-
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told Albert to get in his automobile with him, which Albert 
did, and he drove him on back to his father's home, when he 
had the opportunity to talk with Albert and to observe him as 
he got out of the automobile. He did observe that he was some-
what excited, in a very nervous condition; that he couldn't tell 
what was the matter with him; that he couldn't say whether 
he was drinking; that he thcught he was drinking at the time·, 
but he couldn't swear it; that it was because of the call he had 
received that he thought he was drinking. That he did not 
stagger; that he would say that Albert was not under the in-
fluence of an intoxicant at the time he took him off of the 
truck and took him to his father's home, right up to his fathers' 
front gate, where he got out of the automcbile and went into 
th:: yard: and, that witners turned his automobile and went 
back to his home. On .cross examination by the Common-
wealth this witness stated that if the brakes were defective he 
knew nothing about it; that he said to the defendant, "Homer 
didn't I tell you not to drink on this truck" and he said "I am 
net drunk", that the defendant did not tell him he 
page 1 9 ~ had had an accident. 
CECIL ST AFFORD, a witness for the defendant, testi-
fied that he was Weigh-ma-:ter at the Pembroke Limestone Cor-
poration; and, that he checked cut every load of gravel taken 
away from the Works; that he was at work on the 27th day of 
July, 1 942, and saw Homer Albert, the defendant, frequently 
on that day: that en the Ian trip made, which was weighed-in 
along about four or five o'clock, he saw Albert; and, that the 
truck was backed up to the scales by Leonard Hill, another 
workman on the job, while the defendant, Albert went around 
behind the building to the pump to get him a drink of water; 
that this was nothing unusual as other workman frequently 
backed the trucks in to be loaded while the driver got a drink of 
water, or was absent for rnme other purpose: that he saw and 
did also observe the defendant when he left the Pembroke Lime-
stone Works on this last trip on which the accident occurred; 
and, that there was nothing about his conduct, his manner. his 
appearance, his speech. or any other thing .. to indicate that he 
was drinking, or was under the influence of an intoxicant. 
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ROLAND KARBAUGH, another witness for the defend-
ant, testified that he worked for the Pembroke Limestone Cor-
poration, and was on the job on the 27th day of July, 1942; 
that he knew Homer Albert, the defendant, well, and had 
known him for some years; and that he had seen him frequent-
ly on the job, and frequently on the said 27th day 
page . 20 r of July, I 942; that he saw him when he hauled 
away the last load of stcne on that day, on which 
trip the accident occurred; and, that he saw nothing about the 
manner in which he drove the truck, or about his .condition, 
general appearance, speech, movement, or anything, to indi-
cate that he was intoxicated, but that he didn't pay much atten-
tion to him; that Albert frequently joked with him and other 
men about the works; and, that some jocular remarks were 
probably made at the time of his last loading, but that was noth-
ing unusual, nor was his attention in any way called to the way 
he acted, which was the usual manner: that defendant was all 
the time hollering and carrying on and he was doing that that 
evemng. 
BOB ROBERTSON, another witness for the defendant, 
testified that he had known Homer Albert for several years in 
and around Pembroke, Virginia; and, that on the 27th day of 
July, 1942, at approximately one o'clock in the evening, Homer 
Albert stopped the truck which he was operating, in the village 
of Pembroke, and asked him if he would like to make a frip to 
Bluff City with him to deliver a load of gravel; that he having 
nothing to do, told Homer Albert that he would like· to make 
the trip with him, which he did; that Homer Albert operated 
the truck carefully on the entire trip; and, that from the ap-
pearance, talk and manner in which Homer Albert conducted 
himself that he appeared to be normal, and was certainly sober; 
that he smelt nothing on his breath, nor was there anything 
from his actions or from his speech from which he could indi-
cate that- he was under the influence of an intoxi-
page 2 I r cant, or that he had been drinking. That they ar-
rived back at the Limestone Plant about three p. 
m., after which time he did not see him again that day. 
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H. E. FAYNE, another witness for the defendant, testi-
fied that he took charge of the truck, at the direction of Mr. 
Collins, when the defendant was taken off of it at the bridge, 
and that he did not notice whether he was drunk. 
RICHARD STEELE, another witness for defendant, tes-
tified that he was with Homer four trips that day; that he left 
him at three o'clock that afternoon and didn't see him any 
more; that the brakes on the truck were not good; that they 
would hold for a short distance and then give away; that 
Homer was all right when he left him. 
HOMER ALBERT, testified in his own behalf that he 
was twenty-four years old, lived with his father in Pembroke 
in Giles County, where he was born and where he had. been 
reared, where he had been working for Mr. Collins, driving a 
druck for several months; and that at the time of the accident 
he was, and had been hauling gravel and stone manufactured 
by and at the Pembroke Limestone Corporation works in Pem-
broke, Virginia, which is a distance of seven or eight miles to 
the bridge across New River, near Pearisburg, where the stone 
was being hauled to be used in its construction; that he had 
made on the 27th day of July, 1942, five trips before the last 
one, c·n which trip the accident occurred; that he hauled six 
tons of crushed stone at a load; that on the last trip 
page 22 ~ he made in coming down a long hill toward New 
River which is quite a heavy grade, possibly three-
quarters of a mile, he made it all right until he got to a curve, 
the last curve in the road going down to the en trance of the 
bridge, which was possibly 3 oo yards from the said bridge: 
that the brakes refu~ed to hold, from which time the speed of 
his truck increased and was beyond his control; that it was 
running about 35 miles an hour when it got to the bridge; that 
he tried vainly to pump it with his feet, as is the customary 
way in which this is done; and, that just about I oo feet before 
he got to the entrance cf the bridge the truck was beyond his 
control; and, that then he undertook and leaned over to try to 
control it with the emergency brake. but it was no good, and 
was in such posture upon his entrance upon the bridge, but; 
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that he still was unable to get the brakes to hold and was trying 
to get them to work, and using every means at his disposal to 
make them work, but all to no avail; that he did not see Mr. or 
Mrs. Johnson. He did know that the truck ran into and 
against the guard rail on his right hand side of the road; that 
the road down which he was coming at such speed was in a 
northern and southern direction; and, that the bridge was in 
an eastern and western direction, so that the point of entrance 
from the road onto the bridge was at a considerable angle, so 
that a truck or automobile would naturally be inclined to run 
into and against the balustrade on the right hand side of the 
bridge; and, that this was done while he was using every means 
to control the speed of the truck and get it down; 
page 23 r and, that not having seen Mr. and Mrs. Johnson he 
was still endeavoring to get the truck under con-
trol, and the bridge being level, the speed of the truck was grad-
ually reduced, and he was able to stop it absolutely near the 
west end cf the bridge, and he did stop it on and near the west 
end of the bridge; that the reason he stopped was he thought he 
heard somebody hollow. After remaining there a minute or 
two, witness then started to back his truck to see what had hap-
pened, at which time Mr. Collins drove up and stopped him, 
took him off the truck and took him back to his father's home. 
Mr. Collins was mad and witness was excited and very much 
depres.sed at what might have happened, and on a.ccount of 
Mr. Collins taking him off of the truck in such a summary 
manner. Witness stated positively that at the time he was not 
drunk; that he was not drinking; that he hadn't drunk any in-
toxicant that day, and was absolutely sober; and, that the ac-
cident was caused and occasioned purely and simply because· 
cf the fact that the brakes on the truck would not work; and, 
that he was trying his best to get them to work to avoid trouble 
and did not see the Johnsons at the time the accident occurred. 
or before that time; that Mr. Hedrick came to see him in the jail 
en the following morning and questioned him particularly 
about the accident and everything in regard thereto; that he 
doesn't recall Mr. Hedrick ever telling him and admonishing 
hiin that anyth_ing that he said might be used against him, but 
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that he knew that what he said would be used 
page 24 r against him, but nevertheless he told Mr. Hedrick 
everything about it. He told him that he did not see 
Mr. Johnson and his wife; that he lost control of the truck on 
account of the condition of the brakes; and that he could not 
help doing what had been done. He said Mr. Hedrick came back 
to see- him on the· following morning after the first conversa-
tion in the jail. He was in the presence of Mr. Emory Johnston. 
Sheriff of Giles County or Mr. Poole, the Deputy Sheriff. One 
was present at. each conversation, and witness does. not remem-
ber whether it was the first or the second conversation that the 
r.beriff was present, or whether it was Mr. Poole at the first or 
!1econd conversation. One or the other of the officers was pres-
ent, and Mr. Hedrick came into the jail where the accused was 
.ccnfined, and began again to interrogate the accused, but it 
was as much a lecture as it was a questioning; that Hedrick on 
the second occasion told the accused, saying to him, "You 
know you were drunk on that day", and repeated words to 
that effect several times. The accused may have told Hedrick, 
"Well, I might as well admit that I was drunk because you all 
would r.wear that I was drunk." The accused again told him 
that he was. not drunk, whereupon Hedrick said, "You know 
you are a damn liar, you wa,s drunk". Hedrick then said to 
accused, "Mr. Newton said that you had been called to the 
army, to go on the 8th day of August, and you know you killed 
that woman to keep from having to go to the Army." And 
this, witness denied. 
The accused further stated that after Mr. Collins 
page 25 ~ had taken him home he got out of the Collins' 
automobile and went upon the porch and sat down 
where his fathe.r was. where he answered the quer:tions c.f his 
father, and told him that he didn't know what had happened; 
but possibly something had happened; that he was greatly ex-
cited, nervous and depressed; and, that he had some whiskey in 
his room and he went to his room and did drink not quite a 
pint of liquor, after the drinking of which, and sitting around 
the house for a few minutes, he walked down to Si bold' s Store. 
which was only a short distance away, and there drank a bottle 
of beer and started on back home, and while on the road be-
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tween Sibold's Store and his home, he was arrested by Mr. 
Kanode and Mr. Poole and brought to Pearisburg and placed in 
jail, where he remained several days before bond was given. 
On cross examination, the defendant was asked if he re-
membered the MacMahan automobile blowing for the road 
about 100 yards before it entered the bridge, and he said that he 
did, and when asked if the truck was then out from under con- . 
trol, he said that he did not suppose it. was, and when asked if 
there was any considerable down grade in the road from that 
point to the bridge, he said there was not. He was asked if the 
truck was out from under control and that he was afraid that 
he could not safely enter the bridge, why he did not drive the 
truck straight ahead and up into the Stony Creek Road, and he 
said that he could have done so, but that ·he did not 
page 26 ~ do so. Asked why he had not told the owner of 
the truck that the brakes were defective, he said that 
he just had not done so. Asked if when he pumped the brakes 
if they would hold, he said that sometimes they· would; that 
the reason he didn't see the Johnsons on the bridge was that he 
was wrestling with the truck. 
And the foregoing was substantially the evidence for both 
the Commonwealth and the defendant. 
November r4, 1942. 
Teste: 
A. C. BUCHANAN. 
Judge. 
At the conclusion of the evidence the court gave four in-
structions at the instance of the Commonwealth as follows: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1: 
The .court instructs the jury that involuntary manslaughter 
is the killing of one accidentally, in the commission of some 
unlawful act, not felonious, or in the unlawful performance 
of a lawful act. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 2: 
The court instructs the jury that if you shall believe from 
the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, 
Homer Albert, while he was under the influence of intoxicants, 
drove a truck upon the public highway or bridge, at the time· 
and place of the accident mentioned in the evidence in this case, 
which struck and killed the deceased, and that such 
page 27 r intoxication caused the said accident, then you shall 
find the defendant guilty of involuntary man-
slaughter as charged in the indictment in this case. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3: 
The court instructs the jury that if you shall believe from 
the eviden.ce beyond a reasonable dou~t that at the time and 
place of the accident mentioned in the evidence in this case, that 
the defendant was re·cklessly, negligently, and carelessly driving 
a truck, and that such recklessness, negligence and carelessness 
was so gross and culpable as to indicate a callous disregard of 
human life and of the probable consequeuce of his act, and re-
sulted in the death of the deceased, then you shall find the de-
fendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter as charged in the 
indictment. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4: 
The court instructs the jury that involuntary manslaughter 
is punishable by confinement in the State Penitentiary at not 
less than one year nor more than five years, or in the discretion 
of the jury by confinement in the County Jail not to exceed 
twelve months, or by fine not to exceed one thousand dollars. 
or by both such fine and jail sentence, in the discretion of the 
as reasons for his objections that the instruction was an abstract 
Jury. 
The defendant objected to Instruction No. 1, and assigned 
as reasons for his objections that the instruction was an ab-
stract statement or definition of involuntary man-
page 28 r slaughter, which applied to a specific .case, is mis-
leading and confusing. 
The defendant also objected to Instruction No. 2, and as-
signed as his reason for said objection that it was a finding in-
3 6 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
struction. not taking in the view or defense of the accused; 
that it assumed as a fact that the accused was drunk. and also 
that the truck driven by the accused struck and killed the de-
ceased; and, that it was otherwise incomplete, insufficient and 
misleading to the jury. 
The defendant objected to Instruction No. 3, and assigned 
as reason for his obje'Ction that it was a finding instruction. 
without taking into consideration the defense of the accused. 
and assumed the fact as proved, that the accused's truck struck 
and killed the deceased; and, that it was otherwise· incomplete, 
insufficient and misleading to the jury. 
The defendant objected to Instruction No. 4, but assigned 
no reason for the said objection. 
The foregoing four instructions given at the instance of, 
and for the Commonwealth, were objected to for the reasons 
herein stated, and all of tbe said objections we·re overruled, and 
the defendant excepted. 
November r4, r942. 
Teste: 
A. C. BUCHANAN. 
Judge. 
page 29 ~ DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTIONS 
After the court had approved and given the four fore-
going instructions for the Commonwealth, there were given at 
the instance of the accused, the four following instructions as 
follows: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1: 
The court instructs the jury that Homer Albert is presumed 
to be innocent of the charge placed against him until the Com-
monwealth proves him guilty beyond all reasonable doubt, 
which presumption follows him in every stage of the trial until 
the Commonwealth has proved every element of guilty as 
charged, to the exclusion of every reasonable doubt; and, that 
unless the jury believe from the evidence that the Common-
wealth has so proven every element of guilt, then they· shall find 
Homer Albert not guilty. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 2: 
The court instructs the jury that the .crime charged against 
the defendant is involuntary manslaughter, which is defined as 
the killing of a person accidentally, contrary to the intention of 
the parties, in the prosecution of some unlawful but not felo,n-
ious act, or in the improper performance of a lawful act; how-
ever, the·re must be casual connection between any unlawful act 
which the defendant may have been committing and the in-
jury resulting to the deceased, and there is a burden placed upon 
the Commonwealth to prove the connection, where 
page 30 r it is claimed by the Commonwealth that death 
resulted from the commission of an unlawful act 
of the defendant; and, the .court further instructs the jury 
that before the defendant can be found guilty o.f involuntary 
manslaughter based upon the improper performance of a law-
ful act, there is a burden upon the Commonwealth te prove 
that he was guilty of gross and culpable negligence so as to 
show a callous disregard of human life and of the probable con-
~equences of his acts. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3: 
The court instruct the jury that if you believe from the 
evidence that the proximate cause of the injury received by the 
deceased, was due to mechanical deficiencies in the truck which 
Homer Albert was operating on the occasion charged, which 
mechanical deficiencies were beyond the control of the said 
Homer Albert, and caused an emergency to arise in the opera-
tion of the vehicle, which could not have been foreseen by the 
said Homer Albert, and which said emergency was not created 
by him in the mode or manner in which he operated the vehicle, 
then you shall find the said Homer Albert not guilty of the 
offense charged. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4: 
The court instructs the jury that even though they should 
believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the de-
fendant had been drinking and was under the influence of an 
itoxicant at the time of the accident, yet they can 
page 3 I r not convict the defendant for that reason unless 
they should believe frcm the evidence beyond a 
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reasonable doubt that such intoxication was the sole or a ma-
terial contributing cause for said truck striking the deceased. 
November 14, 1942. 
Teste: 
A. C. BUCHANAN, 
Judge. 
The accused asked the court to instruct the jury as fol-
lows: "The court instructs the jury that before they can con-
vict the defendant they must believe from the evidence beyond 
a reasonable doubt that alleged killing was the result of some 
negligent act, or acts, of the defendant intentionally done, and 
the defendant can not be convicted if the death was occasioned 
by mechanical defects in the said truck or mere inadvertance, for 
which the defendant was not responsible''. because after the 
giving of the instructions for the Commonwealth as they were 
given, it became, and was, necessary that the jury should be in-
structed that they should differentiate between a pure accident 
without fault on the part of the accused, and the intentional 
doing of an unlawful act, but the court refused to give said in-
struction. To which ruling the defendant excepted. 
November 14, 1942. 
Teste: 
A. C. BUCHANAN, 
Judge. 
After the jury had rendered its verdict and had 
page 3 2 ~ been discharged, the defendant moved the court to 
set aside the verdict because it was contrary to the 
law and the evidence upon the following grounds: 
FIRST: That the court erred in giving the first three in-
structions for the Commonwealth for the reasons stated in the 
objections to the said instructions as set out in the certificate· of 
exceptions to the said instructions, and for the· failure to give 
the instruction for the defendant, which was refused ( which is 
referred to in the exceptions for its refusal) . 
SECOND: That a juror, J. A. Newton, had conversed 
with E. B. Hedrick, State Police, after he had testified for the 
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Commonwealth just preceding said conversation, and while the 
case was still pending and before all of the evidence was in, and 
said conversation was concerning his testimony and particular-
ly with reference to the cross examination of the attorney for' 
the accused, in regard to certain "notes", which the witness had 
used on the witness stand while testifying. 
THIRD: And the evidence was not sufficient to sustain 
the verdict, but the court overruled the motion to set aside the 
verdict and entered up judgment on the verdict of the jury to 
which the defendant excepted. 
November 14, 1942. 
Teste: 
A. C. BUCHANAN, 
Judge. 
Upon the trial of this case and during the conclud-
page 33 r ing argument of the Commonwealth's Attorney, 
it was stated by the Commonwealth's Attorney to 
the jury, "Gentlemen of the Jury, he, the defendant, is not 
only guilty of manslaughter, but he is guilty of perjury", to 
which speech the counsel for the defendant objected, and the 
court said to the jury, "They were to try the .case and decide-
the case on the evidence as they heard it from the defendant, by 
counsel, asked the jury to be discha.rged, which motion was 
overruled, and the defendant excepted. 
Teste: November 14, 1942. 
A. C. BUCHANAN. 
Judge. 
On the return of the jury's verdict and upon the jury being 
discharged, the defendant moved the court to set aside the ver-
dict as being contrary to the law and the evidence, because of 
the giving of erroneous instructions, and refusal to give in-
structions for the defendant and fcrther because of the mis-
conduct of a juror during the course of the trial_, to-rwit: 
James A. Newton. · 
And thereupon the said James A. Newton, one cf the 
jurors trying the case as aforesaid, was called by the defendant 
as a witness, and was duly sworn by the court and was ques-
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tioned by Mr. W. B. Snidow of counsel for the defendant as fol-
lows: 
Q. "Mr. Newton, do you remember meeting me on the 
court house steps three minutes after nine o'clock this morning 
and telling me something?'' 
A. "It had reference to questioning Mr. Hedrick 
page 34 ~ about taking notes. I said something to Mr. Hed-
rick late yesterday afternoon in connection with 
taking notes. I said to Mr. Hedrick: "When Mr. Snidow ask-
ed you why you took notes, why didn't you ask him why he 
took notes." Hedrick replied that he was afraid the Judge 
wouldh't like it." 
Mr. Newton further stated that he remarked to Mr. Hed-
rick to the effect that, if course, he would have to take notes of 
all these cases so he could remember about them when testi-
fying: that during the cross-examination of Mr. Hedrick by 
Mr. Snidow, Mr. Snidow had questioned Mr. Hedrick about 
the reason for his keeping the memoranda to which he had re-
ferred while testifying, and that was what he referred to when 
he spoke to Mr. Hedrick, and that his doing so was without 
any significance or meaning in his own mind, but done in a 
humorous spirit; that this was all that passed between him and 
Mr. Hedrick; that he just passed Mr. Hedrick on the street 
after the adjournment of court on the pre.ceding afternoon; 
that he saw Mr. Hedrick everyday in Pearisburg, knew him in-
timately and he said what he did to him wholly in a jocular 
mannet\ and just as a joke, and without intending to do any-
thing wrong. and without being conscious of doing any im-
proper act; and that in the same jocular manner and indulging 
in what he thought was harmless humor, he told Mr. Sriidow. 
attorney for the defendant ,what he had said to Mr. Hedrick. 
In answer to a further question from Mr. Snidow, Mr. 
Newton stated that when he told this to M,r. Snidow, that Mr. 
Snidow made no comment and said nothing at all, 
page 3 5 ~ and immediately left Mr. Newtcn: and that when 
this passed between him and Hedrick, it was on the 
main street in Pearisburg, but nobody else was immediately 
present. 
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The court certifies that when court reconvened immedi-
ately after Mr. Newton, the ju,ror, spoke to Mr. Snidow, at-
torney for the defendant, the defendant .continued with the in-
troduction of his evidence. which was completed about noon of 
that day, and the verdict of the jury was returned late the same 
afternoon, and defendant's motion was made and Mr. Newton 
was called to the stand following the discharge of the jury; 
and that Mr. Newton has for a number of years been employed 
as the Secretary and Treasurer of the St. Elizabeth's Hospital 
located just across the street from the courthouse in Pearisburg 
and is also Chairman of the Giles County Selective Service 
Board. 
The court thereupon overruled defendant's motion to set 
aside the verdict and defendant excepted. 
Teste: This November 14, 1942. 
A. C. BUCHANAN. 
Judge. 
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Virginia, 
Giles County, to-wit: 
· I. F. E. Snidow, Cle_rk of the Circuit Court of the County 
aforesaid, in the State of Virginia, do hereby certify that the 
foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the record and 
proceedings in the case of Commonwealth of Virginia against 
Homer Albert, late pending in said Court, with all things touch-
ing the same, as fully and wholly as they now exist among the 
records of my said office. 
And I further certify that notice of the transcript was 
waived by the Attorney for the Commonwealth. 
Given under my hand this the· 30th day of November, 
1942. 
F. E. SNIDOW, 
Clerk, Cir.cuit Court of Giles 
County, Virg~nia. 
A Copy-Teste: 
J. W. HUTTON. 
Deputy Clerk. 
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